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i. intrOductiOn 
It is widely agreed that voluntary economic interactions are 
based on an overlap of interest. This paper argues that ex-
changes typically rely not just on an overlap of interest, but 
on a more extensive agreement. To explain the emergence 
of the more extensive agreement we examine Adam Smith’s 
work and we look into the broad conceptual frame that the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1984) provides for the 
Wealth of Nations (1776/1981). What we find is a theory of 
self-interested human beings that typically seek moral ap-
proval which is gained by adhering to emergent rules of pro-
priety. In Smith’s account propriety—or, indeed, the search 
for mutual agreement—is the fundamental motivation of 
human actions. Smith further demonstrates how mutual 
sympathy between two individuals can be extended to a 
wider scope of social interactions, his notion of the impartial 
spectator, and the internalization of this construct, is a theo-
ry of how notions of propriety that originate in the intimate 
order are extended to communities and ultimately society at 
large. 
Smith’s theory provides a foundation for more recent work 
in economic sociology which demonstrates that markets are 
in part structured by emergent orders of worth (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 1999; 2006).1 The common ground is the is-
sue of justification: how can we justify market exchanges? 
Although a minimal justification would be that the seller 
is willing to sell at a price at which the buyer is willing to 
buy, we argue here that most market exchanges rely on more 
extensive agreement between buyers and sellers. This neces-
sity for more extensive agreement is particularly visible for 
“contested commodities”—artifacts for which it is not gener-
ally agreed that monetary exchange is the appropriate way 
of exchanging them (Radin 1996)—goods that were previ-
ously not traded on markets, or which have more recently 
been shielded from market exchange. This is not to say 
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that such agreement does not underlie other “non-contest-
ed” exchanges, but since there is widespread acceptance of 
the underlying agreement on how to estimate the value of 
non-contested commodities, that agreement is less directly 
visible. 
Our thesis that exchanges typically rely not just on an 
overlap of interest, but on a more extensive agreement rests 
on a contention that the orders of worth that embed this 
agreement and thus shape markets are emergent phenom-
ena, just like market prices. They are kinds of emergent non-
price coordination, and complement the price coordination 
that takes place in markets and is widely regarded as the pri-
mary type of emergent coordination. These orders of worth 
are built on interpersonal agreement about the appropriate 
way to justify the worth of artifacts that agents deal with 
in their social interactions, they structure why and how ex-
changes take place in the market. 
We challenge the notion that prices are the sole emergent 
coordinating mechanism at work in market exchanges, and 
we provide a theoretical framework that allows us to analyze 
disputes that arise over contested commodities. We show 
an important link between the work of Adam Smith and 
contemporary economic sociology. This link helps us move 
beyond many of the ethical disputes on whether everything 
should be for sale (Sandel 2012) suggesting an empirical way 
forward that studies the way in which moral justifications 
and critiques of market exchange emerge.
In what follows, using Smith’s notion of sympathy we de-
velop an account of how interpersonal norms can spread 
throughout more extensive orders. Using the framework of 
Boltanski and Thévenot we show what kind of orders help 
structure market exchanges both in terms of justifying them 
(why should we buy and sell?) and in terms of propriety (how 
should we buy and sell?). Finally, we illustrate the value of 
this framework by analyzing the emergence of markets for 
two contested goods, contemporary art and surrogate moth-
erhood. 
2. mOst marKEt transactiOns rELY  
 On mOrE than OnE sYstEm Of  
 cOOrdinatiOn 
The notion of coordination is a concept related to the no-
tion of order. These two notions are inextricably linked since 
order is the result of a coordination of various elements 
of a group (Caldwell 2004, p. 309; see also Hayek 1967). 
Economists of all sorts have stressed the coordinating capac-
ities of the market system. The way that markets coordinate 
human actions is through prices. High relative prices indi-
cate scarcity and provide incentives to look for substitutes, 
low relative prices on the other hand point toward a profit 
opportunity. Hayek marveled at the economy of price coor-
dination pointing out how little the individual participant 
needs to know to take the right course of action; the agent 
merely needs to follow a symbol, an aggregated essence of 
knowledge about a change in the system that is passed from 
the man on the spot to those who are concerned about that 
knowledge (Hayek 1945, pp. 526–527). 
But is it really true that market prices do all the coordina-
tive work? Is price coordination the only emergent form of 
coordination or are the some other forms of non-price coor-
dination that shape market outcomes and human exchange 
more generally?2 What role does (moral) persuasion play in 
facilitating exchange? And is it not true that shared notions 
of what is valuable also emerge on markets? Perhaps prices 
alone are not always as useful a signal as economist assume 
and, perhaps, non-price signals are not as useless as we are 
sometimes led to think.
One response to these issues is that prices take over the 
role that other forms of coordination fulfill in more intimate 
settings. Hayek believed that more extensive agreement is 
usually necessary within intimate orders: “Cooperation, like 
solidarity, presupposes a large measure of agreement on ends 
as well as on methods employed in their pursuit. It makes 
sense in a small group whose members share particular hab-
its, knowledge and beliefs about possibilities” (Hayek 1988, 
p. 19). But he is quick to emphasize that such agreement lim-
its what the group can achieve: “[Cooperation] makes hardly 
any sense when the problem is to adapt to unknown circum-
stances; yet it is this adaptation to the unknown on which the 
coordination of efforts in the extended order rests” (ibid). 
In fact Hayek develops what could be called the two-world 
hypothesis in which he argues that the small group and the 
extended order are based on rival and contradictory norms 
and rules:
If we were to apply the unmodified, uncurbed, rules 
of the micro-cosmos to the macro-cosmos (our wider 
civilization), as our instincts and sentimental yearn-
ings often make us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet 
if we were always to apply the rules of the extended or-
der to our more intimate groupings, we would crush 
them. So we must learn to live in two sorts of world at 
once (Hayek 1988, p. 18). 
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We read Adam Smith as making an argument that the two 
orders are indeed based on different and occasionally con-
flicting principles, but that the relation between these two 
orders is gradual rather than oppositional as Hayek seems 
to suggest. In fact, Adam Smith’s notion of mutual sympa-
thy is the concept that connects the intimate order with the 
extended order.
There are in fact implicit clues in Hayek’s work that suggest 
that coordination of plans depends not only on prices, but 
also on social norms (Vaughn 1999). As Paul Lewis and Peter 
Lewin (2015) rightly point out, the knowledge that agents 
need to coordinate their plans is contained not only in price 
signals but also in formal and informal social rules. Prices 
are not unambiguous pieces of information and any infor-
mation about changes, about social phenomena including 
information about changes in prices must first be interpreted 
and understood before people can use it as their knowledge 
and act upon it. Consequently, “the dissemination of knowl-
edge required for plan coordination is facilitated not only 
by price signals but also by a set of intersubjectively shared 
rules and norms” (Lewis and Lewin 2015, p. 3).We wish to 
expand on this work and propose a theoretical framework 
built around Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments to 
provide some insights into how shared rules of interpreta-
tion and norms of categorization emerge as an unintended 
consequence of the search for moral approval.
2.1 Emergent Non-Price Coordination
We contend that apart from the price coordination, there are 
systems of coordination that function on the basis of signals 
distinct from prices. These are systems of coordination that 
rely on approval and disapproval; it is here assumed that 
these systems of coordination rest on the tendency of agents 
toward sympathy. Consequently, these non-price systems of 
coordination often have direct impact on the functioning 
of the price-system coordination. Apart from market pri-
ces, approval and disapproval (the smile and the frown) are 
therefore other sources of emergent coordination.3
Sympathy in the sense we employ it is a technical term 
meaning coeffective behavior.4 Smith in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (henceforth TMS) thought of sympathy as a 
projection; it is a sentiment that can be both positive and 
negative. For instance, when our friend wins a lottery our 
“sympathetic passion” tends to coincide with his happiness. 
On the other hand, when our family member or our friend 
suffers a loss, we tend to mourn with her. This is “the sympa-
thetic passion of the spectator” (TMS, I, iii, I, § 9).
Sympathy is a concept distinct from compassion, further-
more, sympathy is a sentiment distinct from approbation. 
Sympathy makes it possible for us to evaluate and esteem ac-
tions of other men and of ourselves; this act of evaluation or 
judgment simply consists in the emotion which arises from 
a coincidence between the spectator’s projection, the sympa-
thetic passion, and the original reaction of the person prin-
cipally concerned. In this sense, sympathy is a “fundamental 
principle in human nature” that is propelled by a desire to 
agree, “to be in accord with our fellow men” (Haakonssen 
1981, p. 49). Although we tend to share the joy of winning 
a lottery with our friends, we would perhaps disapprove of 
their reaction were it exaggerated or inconsiderate. This is 
the mechanism behind social approval and disapproval. 
If we approve of another’s reactions as appropriate to their 
situation, we generally tend to observe that we can imagine 
ourselves in the person’s situation, we can entirely sympa-
thize with them. On the other hand, when we disapprove, 
perhaps, observing a biased or a corrupt judge, in such a sit-
uation we cannot completely bring ourselves to sympathize 
with the person with question (TMS, I, i, 3, § 1). In that sense 
Smith provides a theory that revolves around the proper re-
sponse to a situation. 
How can any agent know whether his or her actions are 
proper and permissible? We suggest that the sentiment of 
approval or disapproval always presupposes “some other be-
ing” who judges of the observed actions of agents. In turn, 
it is only by sympathizing with the “arbiter of his conduct” 
that an agent can decide whether his actions are proper and 
permissible. Social interactions—regardless of whether they 
take place in a market setting—always consist of at three 
classes of agents: there are always the interacting agents and 
“some other being” called a spectator (see Figure 1). At the 
most basic level both the agents and the spectator can be in-
dividuals. But the agents and/or the spectator can be groups 
of people, communities, firms, or organizations. The specta-
tor can be endowed with political power, the spectator can 
be a jury, etc. Most importantly, as Smith suggested, the 
spectator can be the conscience of the agent that substitutes 
for any other “real” spectator. 
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Figure 1: Every social interaction always consists of three kinds 
of agents, the interacting agents and a spectator who judges 
the actions and motives of these agents and the interaction (I) 
between them. 
Smith gives us a step-by-step theory of sympathetic evalu-
ations through which the spectator either approves or disap-
proves of agents’ actions and interactions. First, the spectator 
must put himself into the agent’s shoes in order to distance 
himself from his present situation and to “expose himself to 
the same causal influences as the man originally concerned” 
(Haakonssen 1981, p. 51). Second, the spectator reacts to this 
imagined situation after having exposed himself to the sen-
timents that the man originally concerned have felt. Third, 
the spectator compares the original actions of the observed 
agent with his response to sentiments that were brought up 
by the imaginary change of situation. Finally, in case of a co-
incidence of these two sentiments, the spectator feels a kind 
of pleasure—he approves—or, in case of less than a perfect 
coincidence, a kind of pain—in which case he disapproves.
But since sympathy is something mutual between men, it 
is both given and taken, agents judge and are being judged. 
The realization that there is something to be observed and 
judged makes the agent adjust his behavior and imagine 
how his actions would look in the eyes of other spectators. 
Consequently, agents try to arrive at a spectator position 
toward themselves. When we try to create such a spectator 
position, we must first distance ourselves from our present 
situation, we try to take an impartial perspective with re-
gard to our situation. Second, we try to imagine how such 
an imagined impartial and fair spectator would react to our 
original situation. Third, we try to see whether this imag-
ined fair spectator could enter into and sympathize with our 
original motives and actions. Finally, if we can thoroughly 
enter into our original motives and passions, we approve 
of them. This evaluation of our own actions is impossible 
without the exercise of removing ourselves from our natural 
station. We can, however, often achieve this by imagining 
how our actions and interactions appear through the eyes of 
other people. Such an exercise of self-reflection based in our 
sympathetic sentiments gives rise to a process of permanent 
adjustment of our beliefs about what the proper and permis-
sible actions and motives are. We create and permanently 
adjust our projection of an impartial spectator, which is the 
model of morally right action. This adjustment is a social 
process by way of which shared social standards that make 
social life possible unintendedly emerge.
Through the operation of mutual sympathy, improper ac-
tions and interactions are weeded out.5 It is important to un-
derstand, however, that it is not merely the original behavior 
of agents that makes the spectator approve or disapprove 
by way of this sympathetic exercise. The factor which ulti-
mately determines the sympathetic evaluation is the logic of 
a situation within which the observed behavior takes place: 
“Sympathy … does not arise so much from the view of the 
passion, as from that of the situation which excites it” (TMS, 
I, i, I, §10). The cause of sympathy is therefore not the origi-
nal observed act but the situation within which the behavior 
takes place; moral evaluation is a problem of appropriate be-
havior in light of a given situation, “[t]o be able to judge is 
to be able to know the situation” (Haakonssen 1981, p. 47).6
In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion 
or disproportion, which the affection seems to bear to 
the cause or object which excites it, consists the propri-
ety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness, of 
the consequent action. (TMS, I, i, 3, § 6) 
Evaluating behavior as proper is essentially a two-step 
process. First, the logic of the situation needs to be identi-
fied: what type of situation is it, and what type of behavior 
is appropriate and suitable in this situation? Or more to the 
point, what are the (common) goods that we aim for in these 
type of situations? Second, what is the extent to which the 
relevant artifact contributes to these common goods? As we 
will explain in the following section, the first step necessarily 
involves ambiguity about which situational logic is at play. 
The second step, consequently, introduces a problem of how 
to reconcile competing individual valuations within the giv-
en situation. The suitableness and the propriety of behavior 
is necessarily context dependent—it changes with time and 
place—we consider someone’s conduct suitable when “we 
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observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general 
rules” (TMS, VII, iii, 3, §16).
To give just one example the type of behavior that is ap-
propriate and suitable is different when we are sleeping in a 
hotel or sleeping in a friend’s house. Both for the hotel staff, 
our friends, and you as guest. Ambiguity about the appropri-
ateness might however arise when it is not quite clear what 
type of exchange we are engaged in. If we are couch-surfing 
are paying guests supposed to behave as friends would, or 
rather as we would in a hotel? Underlying this ambiguity is 
an ambiguity about the type of common goods we are trying 
to achieve. Although customary conventions are historically 
contingent, they are very real in the sense that they provide 
an ecological rationality. 
We live in a pluralistic society with multiple notions of the 
common good to strive for; multiple notions of justice are 
operative in modern societies. These plural notions of jus-
tice are best thought of as competing representations of the 
impartial spectator. How can people agree on which repre-
sentation of the impartial spectator is the right one? What 
if our representations of the impartial spectator collide? Are 
we bound to disagree and fall into dissonance or conflict?
3. cOOrdinatiOn and OrdErs Of WOrth
Recent work in economic sociology provides further insight 
into what we identified above as the ecological rationality 
typical of exchange situations, broadly conceived. Boltanski 
and Thévenot (2006) speak of diverse “worlds” within which 
distinct justifications are constituted. They argue that in situ-
ations of conflict, actions will have to be justified. From an 
analysis of a wide variety of such disputes they have distilled 
six distinct worlds in which actions can be justified. They rec-
ognize that these justifications of goodness are not mutually 
exclusive, but frequently reinforce each other. On the other 
hand, they also emphasize that when two orders of worth are 
used simultaneously there is always the possibility of friction 
and conflict. These orders of worth are not “hostile worlds” 
(Zelizer 2000), instead they represent a plurality of justifica-
tions that co-exist and structure social interactions.
Their account shares important similarities with that of 
Smith. Both theories emphasize the importance of propriety, 
and the context-dependence of propriety. They also share an 
emphasis on the plurality and imprecise nature of the good. 
But where Smith emphasizes elements of estimative justice, 
how should we respond to particular situations, Boltanski 
and Thévenot add the analysis of the content of that justice. 
Their orders of worth are substantive possible justifications 
of particular actions, and modes of criticism to delegitimize 
the actions of others. Whereas Smith’s account focuses on 
the search for mutual agreement, Boltanski and Thévenot fo-
cus on the possibility of dispute. The justifications of actions, 
they argue cannot be reduced to a single standard or order 
of worth, as various social sciences, including neoclassical 
economics, have attempted. These orders of worth reflect the 
plurality of standards in contemporary societies.
There are six orders of worth that Boltanski and Thévenot 
identify: the inspired world, the domestic world, the civic 
world, the world of fame, the industrial world and finally the 
market world. From these they have derived worlds that in-
ternally cohere and justify action and decision-making. The 
domestic world, for example, is characterized by good man-
ners, conventions and tradition and strongly based on hier-
archical relationships between parents and children, kings 
and subjects. Propriety in this world requires loyalty, service, 
obedience and civility. And actions are justified in relation to 
the common good of a shared tradition, or the position in a 
“natural” hierarchy. 
The market world is, on the other hand, free from the 
prejudices and attachments that characterize the domestic 
world. It is characterized by competition, rivalry, buying and 
selling and the creation of value for others. Typical relation-
ships are those between buyer and seller, or employer and 
employee. And propriety in this world requires one to please 
the customer, to remain alert to opportunities, to negotiate, 
and to fulfill one’s contractual obligations. While markets 
tend to be open and geographically unbound, the domestic 
world is typically attached to certain places and customs. It is 
thus a frequent criticism that the market makes everything 
equal, robbing it of the distinctiveness and particularity that 
is important in the domestic world. Too much dependence 
on domestic relationships might also look like favoritism in 
the merit-based world of the market. Or, to use Smith’s lan-
guage, such motives would be a form of impropriety. 
To illustrate the idea of multiple co-existing orders of 
worth, David Stark asks us to think of writing an academ-
ic letter of recommendation. These letters typically invoke 
multiple orders of worth: 
In fact, a given letter might include performance crite-
ria from each of the six orders of worth. We would not 
be surprised, for example, to read that a given candi-
date is “very creative” (the inspiration); that she is in-
credibly “productive” (the industrial); and that she is 
a “good citizen” (the civic). Moreover, the same letter 
could note that her work is “frequently cited” (the or-
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der of fame or renown) and that she is fiercely “loyal 
to her graduate students” (check off another [the do-
mestic]). Has the letter writer neglected the market 
order? We are not likely to hear about an academic as 
the author of a “best-selling” book. Look through the 
letter again and you might find that the candidate “has 
a strong record of getting grants”. (Stark 2009, p. 12)
Stark’s example does not only suggest that plural orders 
of worth are operative, but also that academic performance, 
like many other “goods”, are valued for a variety of quali-
ties not all of which can nor should be priced; our idea of 
what they are good for is complex and plural. This variety 
also points to possible tensions between these worlds. In 
fact outside of the inflated realm of recommendation let-
ters, it seems unlikely that any academic can contribute to all 
these common goods. We may, for example, think of trade-
offs that exist between the goal of being “very creative” and 
“highly productive”. But the strength of the Boltanski and 
Thévenot framework is that they demonstrate that most situ-
ations are open to these type of conflicts, in the sense that 
they are never wholly determined or formed by one order 
of worth. Just like in Smith’s broad virtue ethics framework, 
the goods to strive for tend to be multiple. As they argue: 
“Equitable judgment seeks to appease the tensions inherent 
in the plurality of principles of agreement in this universe, by 
making accommodations and by taking recourse to mitigat-
ing circumstances” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, p. 150). 
In our illustrative case studies below we show how such 
accommodations play a vital role in the justification of mar-
ket exchange of goods, that are thought to be unsuitable for 
it. Boltanski and Thévenot add one important insight that 
links their work up with that of Adam Smith. In Smith’s work 
we find the notion of the impartial spectator which symbol-
izes the notion of justice. Boltanski and Thévenot similarly 
emphasize what they call the “reflective moment” in action 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, pp. 348–349). It is in such re-
flective moments, which can be individual or social, that the 
relevant notions of justice are invoked and come into con-
flict with each other. We should therefore examine disputes, 
for it is in such situations that a presumed implicit agree-
ment needs to be made explicit. When we look at the cases of 
contemporary art and surrogate motherhood in a moment 
we will see that when the legitimacy of the monetary ex-
change is challenged, competing orders of worth, and hence 
competing notions of the common good are invoked in the 
dispute.
Before we turn to our illustrative cases, let us first summa-
rize what our theoretical framework consists of. Inspired by 
Adam Smith we argue that human interactions are driven by 
the desire for agreement. Smith emphasizes the way in which 
this process of search for agreement unintendedly gives rise 
to norms of propriety, in terms of exchange relationships, 
this is the how of exchange. The framework of Boltanski and 
Thévenot touches on many points with that of Smith, but it 
emphasizes two additional aspects. First, it makes explicit 
the plurality of notions of justice in modern societies, and 
the way in which these may lead to compromise and conflict. 
Second, by emphasizing the justification of actions in reflec-
tive moments, it makes clear why an exchange might take 
place, or to what common good it contributes. Taken togeth-
er their work provides a theoretical framework that allows 
us to study how new markets are justified and how norms of 
propriety emerge on such a market. By doing so we demon-
strate the importance of more extensive agreement on such 
norms of propriety and justice on markets, thereby under-
cutting the strong distinction that is typically drawn between 
exchanges in the intimate order and the extended order. 
4. thE EXchangE Of “cOntEstEd  
 cOmmOditiEs”
In this section we examine two kinds of artifacts for which 
market exchange is contested. For these artifacts it is not 
generally accepted that market exchange is the appropriate 
way of dealing with them (Satz 2010; Brennan and Jaworski 
2015). Examining the justifications underlying and the prac-
tices surrounding the exchange of such artifacts allows us 
to analyze the agreement that, if reached, is necessary to le-
gitimize market exchange. The analysis of the exchange of 
such contested commodities allows us to do so because the 
agreement has only recently been achieved, or because it the 
agreement is still incomplete. 
4.1 Galleries: What is a New Painting Worth?
One type of contested commodities are artistic products, 
about which it is frequently argued that they are not fit for 
the market, because that would lead to commercialization 
of the products, devaluation or inauthentic art. This is also 
a type of good for which gift exchange is very important: 
between donors and artists, between artists who exchange 
their work (and views), as well as in donations to museums 
by private collectors. This exchange through gifts is often ac-
companied by a denunciation of market exchange (Abbing 
2002, p. 39). As Hans Abbing points out navigating these two 
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spheres of interaction requires considerable skill on the side 
of the artist and other players in the art sector. Can gifts ever 
be transformed into objects of monetary exchange? And 
what is precisely the status of a sale to a “friend” for less than 
the market value? When operating in the sphere of mon-
etary transactions it is important that the “sacredness” and 
love for art is respected. Somehow the gap between these 
two spheres has to be bridged. In terms of the Boltanski and 
Thévenot framework, the worlds have to be reconciled. 
Olav Velthuis, in his study of the contemporary art mar-
ket in Amsterdam and New York, similarly distinguishes 
between a logic of the arts which centers on quality—the 
connection between man and his work and the importance 
of inspiration and passion, motivations and justifications that 
overlap with the inspired world of Boltanski and Thévenot—
and an economic logic organized around commensuration 
and monetary measurement. According to the market logic, 
goods are produced for profit and value that is independent 
of the maker or current owner (Velthuis 2005). This econom-
ic logic is organized around sellers and buyers, as Boltanski 
and Thévenot argue about the market order of worth and is 
aimed at a certain impersonality of the valuation. 
To engage in a legitimate or justified exchange buyers and 
sellers must agree, not just on a price, but also on why mon-
etary exchange is proper in this case. If both the buyer and 
the seller share a love of art then a monetary exchange is 
legitimate, but even so the exchanges are heavily structured 
by norms of propriety as Velthuis’s (2005) study of pricing 
strategies for contemporary art galleries demonstrates. The 
gallerist, who typically takes in about 50% of the retail price, 
has the function of keeping these worlds separate while at 
the same time connecting them. This somewhat paradoxi-
cal situation is reflected in the set-up of the art gallery as 
Velthuis shows. Galleries usually have a front and a back 
room, in the front room the artwork is displayed and there is 
no talk of money, the back room, on the other hand, is where 
deals are made. In the front room, where the art is, the con-
versation is about inspiration, meaning and creativity. In the 
back room the conversation is about what the work might 
fetch in the market (see also Coslor 2010). This physically 
separates the two logics, that of the market and that of the 
inspired world.
In line with what our theoretical framework suggests, gal-
lerists and buyers go to great length to signal and demon-
strate that they buy art for the right reasons. Gallerists prefer 
to sell to those buyers who share the passions of inclinations 
of the painter, the collectors. There is typically a preference 
for institutional collectors because they bestow more pres-
tige upon the artist by deeming him worthy of collecting, 
and are more likely to display the work. While selling to in-
vestors occurs, it is generally denounced, by both gallerists 
themselves and by artists. Prices, typically not posted, might 
be increased in such exchanges (they are not buying for the 
right reason). Velthuis demonstrates further that it is inap-
propriate for the gallery owner to “market” the works in his 
gallery, instead he acts as a critic and educator (otherwise 
he is not selling for the right reason). There is no just-below 
pricing going on, something that once again reeks of a domi-
nance of the market logic, and the biography of an art work 
is essential in the story about it. Who made it, where was it 
made, what inspired the work and who owned it before. The 
rhetoric, an important aspect of norms of propriety and the 
how of the exchange, is firmly rooted in the world of inspi-
ration (Velthuis 2005). Although Velthuis does not interpret 
his findings along the lines of propriety and denunciation, 
his study shows how these structure the way in which ex-
changes take place, and how these exchanges are justified. 
Gallery owners, in their role as market intermediaries are 
constantly negotiating the tension between these two logics 
and justifications. Velthuis for examples cites one of the gal-
lery owners who describes the process of telling his artists 
which artworks sold well: 
Of course I will tell an artist what people think of an 
exhibition and which work they appreciate in particu-
lar, but you have to do it very carefully. Otherwise you 
intrude on artistic integrity. So you have to use very 
artistic sentences in order to get away with that. I will 
never proceed to say that they should make more of 
certain works (Velthuis 2005, p. 91)
The social setting of the galleries in this respect is im-
portant. The art world is well-organized and there is exten-
sive monitoring and social sanctioning of behavior that is 
improper (Becker 1984). As such the recursive process of 
constructing a representation of the impartial spectator is 
very present in this particular setting. Gallerists can diverge 
too much from emerging norms of propriety, but by do-
ing so they place themselves in a different market segment. 
“Respectable” galleries do not sell spin-off work or any type 
of merchandise which would once again bring out the con-
flict between the inspired and the market world. The devi-
ants, however, consciously appeal to a logic of reaching out 
to the public and making art available to everyone. They are 
more responsive to the wishes of the consumer (paintings 
that match the interior and the couch). In other words they 
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negotiate the tension differently, but as a consequence they 
are not able to charge the same prices because justifications 
of high value using the inspired or artistic justifications typi-
cally lead to higher prices (Velthuis 2008, p. 48). 
Velthuis’s study, from which we extensively borrow here, 
lets us demonstrate a key insight: the justification of mon-
etary exchange relies on the shared appreciation of art. We 
have shown that that the why of the exchange (the love of 
art), and the way in which the deal contributes to the pres-
tige in the world of inspiration are two crucial elements for 
the functioning of the contemporary art market. These two 
factors give rise to a host of norms of propriety that structure 
the behavior and in turn enable the market exchange. These 
emergent norms legitimize a type of exchange that other-
wise would be considered to degrade the product involved. 
Whether monetary exchange can be justified nonetheless, 
depends on whether agreement can be found on the com-
mon goal to contribute to, which will impact on how such 
monetary exchanges will take place. Sometimes such agree-
ment has not been found or is actively disputed. Sometimes, 
as our next illustrative case shows, justifications come to be 
constructed for goods previously not traded on the market. 
4.2 Selling Babies vs. Renting Out Reproductive Capacities
Although motherhood used to be an uncontested category, 
the introduction of in vitro fertilization and the subsequent 
combination of this new technology with diverse contractual 
arrangements introduced a fundamental confusion in terms 
of what can and what cannot and should not be legitimately 
done.
Surrogacy agreements involve typically “a man and a 
woman who are a couple (the “intended parents”) and an-
other woman (the “carrying mother”) who agrees to carry 
a pregnancy for them” (Shalev 1998, p. 83). In some juris-
dictions, and depending on our conception of “mother”, the 
surrogacy contract may be subject to criminal punishment. 
In such cases the contract most likely involves a transaction 
of selling the child and as such is most likely going to be il-
legal. If, on the other hand, we consider the legal mother to 
be the commissioning mother, then the contract essentially 
involves a temporary provision of reproductive capacities; 
the “intended parents” merely rent the womb of the “car-
rying mother”. Whether it would be the one or another was 
in the case of surrogacy to be determined by a process of 
“representational redescription” (Denzau and North 1994) 
through which our categories of thought are constantly 
shaped and molded. Entrepreneurs, by means of legitimat-
ing new combinations, played a crucial role in this process.
In the United States surrogacy has been justified by means 
of stressing the “constitutional right of privacy which pro-
tects personal decisions with respect to marriage and re-
production” (Keane 1980, p. 147). This is a justification that 
emphasizes the “civic” worth of surrogacy—it empowers the 
contractual parties by way of expanding their freedom to 
choose with regard to procreation. A right for a mother to 
ask a price for the service she considers fit has been justified 
by way of diverse reasons. First, “[u]nless surrogate mothers 
can be offered meaningful compensation for their services, 
very few children will be brought legally into the world in 
this manner” (Keane 1980, p. 153), consequently, “a prohibi-
tion on compensation for surrogate motherhood is equiva-
lent to a prohibition of the practice” (Keane 1980, p. 164). 
On a more general level, “it is difficult to specify precisely 
why the ‘commercialization’ of a surrogate motherhood ar-
rangement is inconsistent with public policy … ‘commer-
cialization’ is the usual way in which many individual needs 
are satisfied” (Keane 1980, p. 156). 
It is evident that justifications in the United States relied 
on a combination of the civic world and the market world. In 
other countries these two worlds tend to be more in conflict 
with one another, but in the United States the civic world 
typically empowers the individual, which makes it easier to 
combine civic with market justifcations. The entrepreneurs 
and the surrogate mothers would also stress that they are in 
fact giving a “gift of life”, thus at the same time attempting to 
reinforce the common good of the domestic world, to which 
this artifact used to belong. The surrogate mothers as well as 
the facilitators of this exchange would sometimes emphasize 
that although made possible by way of financial compensa-
tion that makes up for the lost opportunities and incurred 
pain on the surrogate’s side, this compensation is in no way 
expressing the worth of the unique “gift of life”. Justifying 
surrogacy along the civic, market and domestic lines gradu-
ally transformed the climate of opinion. Whereas in 1983 
only about 39% of the US population approved of surrogacy, 
in 1992, it was about 55% of population that came to approve 
(Kuchař 2016).
It is illuminating to compare the process of justification of 
surrogacy in United States with the same process that took 
place in Israel and see how the interplay of different orders 
of worth differs in terms of what are the proper and permis-
sible ways of carrying out surrogacy agreements. As Elly 
Teman (2003, p. 79) puts it, “the same technology can be op-
positely ‘naturalized’ according to different agendas.” Teman 
adds that “the Jewish-Israeli experience of surrogacy may be 
read as a product of the Israeli cultural context,” where the 
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“state interest in a ‘naturalized’, ‘gene-based’ notion of Jewish 
identity” plays a crucial role (Teman 2003, p. 92). In Israel 
“the centrality of the values of family and childbearing goes 
unchallenged” and the state fertility policies are extremely 
generous. Consequently, “[t]he incidence of infertility treat-
ment … measured by the number of clinics per capita … is 
the highest in the world, four times larger than in the United 
States” (Shalev 1998, p. 75).
As Teman notes, highlighting the distinctive character-
istics of the “civic” justifications of surrogacy in Israel, “the 
biblical directive of Jewish tradition to ‘be fruitful and mul-
tiply’ and the emotional needs of a people in a permanent 
state of war” result in the fact that the “cultural reproduc-
tive imperative is so strong that Israeli legislation actively 
encourages Israeli women to pursue technologically assisted 
reproduction” (Teman 2003, p. 80). Israeli women “enter into 
symbolic relations with the state specifically through their 
roles as wives and mothers” and when they decide to enter 
into a surrogacy agreement, they often tend to “use medical 
metaphors to create the ‘artificial body’ … creating a distinc-
tion between the ‘medically managed’ body of surrogacy and 
the individual, ‘natural body’ that they inhabit regularly” ( 
Teman 2003, pp. 84–85). 
Finally, when entering into a surrogacy agreement “the 
amount of payment [a carrying mother can be paid] is sub-
ject to the approval of the statutory approval committee and 
is not a matter of freedom of contract as in personal ser-
vices and labor contracts … if the carrying mother receives 
payment beyond the approved sum she is liable to criminal 
prosecution for an offence carrying a maximum penalty of 
one year imprisonment” (Shalev 1998, p. 93). In the case 
of Israeli surrogacy, the “industrial” and “civic” orders of 
worth thus link up at the expense of the domestic justifi-
cation. Surrogacy is regarded as a way to carry out a civic 
duty and to contribute to a common good of the people of 
Israel. As Teman points out, in the case of Israeli surrogacy 
there is also a prominent role of justification based on the 
“fame” order of worth: “[U]nmarried women in Israel use 
motherhood as a channel of status enhancement, because 
the stigma against single women in Israel is far greater than 
that against single mothers” (Teman 2003:, p. 92). When sur-
rogacy comes into play, Israeli women tend to consider it as 
“a status-enhancing experience personally and dismissing 
the threat of their further marginalization” (Teman 2003, 
p. 93) had they remained childless. Unlike in the United 
States, “[c]riticism of the technology inside Israel is almost 
non-existent” (Shalev 1998, pp. 75–76) and its justification is 
built around a heavily subsidized state-managed “industry” 
that gives Israeli women incentives to enhance their “civic” 
status by way of serving their country.7
Norms of propriety and even the justifications for surro-
gate motherhood differ between Israel and the United States. 
But both cases clearly show that agreement has to be con-
structed, and is far more extensive than an overlap of inter-
est. The different orders of worth are not necessarily hostile 
worlds, but reconciling plural notions of worth requires 
work. The agreement, moreover, is not isolated, but occurs 
within a broader legal and social context, that has to approve 
of the exchange. 
The case-studies of art and reproduction demonstrate that 
more than a narrow overlap of interest is involved in the 
market exchange of these goods. For markets to function 
non-price coordination is necessary to allow individuals to 
agree on the propriety of the exchange, and on the appropri-
ate way to understand and value the artifact. We specifically 
expect to find these “contested commodities” at the border 
between the intimate and the extended order. In such cases 
the agreement in smaller social groups has to be extended 
to the broader and more open market context. The resulting 
agreements, if reached, on the justification of the why and 
how of market exchange allow agents to pursue their self-in-
terest, they constrain and enable what is proper and permis-
sible at any given time and place. The construction of these 
justifications is the work of market-makers or entrepreneurs. 
Looking into the effects of entrepreneurship in the non-price 
processes of coordination is the next logical step of inquiry.
5. cOncLusiOn
Not all emergent systems of coordination are price systems, 
there are alternative systems of non-price coordination that 
emerge from human interactions. This article has examined 
in particular how the desire for mutual sympathy and the re-
sulting norms of propriety structure markets showing that 
market exchanges rely on an agreement than is more ex-
tensive than just an agreement on a price. To examine the 
nature of this more extensive agreement we have developed 
a theoretical framework based on Adam Smith’s notion of 
sympathy, and Boltanski and Thévenot’s concept of orders 
of worth. The emergent systems of non-price coordination 
we have examined here are built on an interpersonal agree-
ment about the appropriate way to justify the worth of arti-
facts that agents deal with in their social interactions. From 
that justification, associated norms of propriety emerge, that 
structure market exchanges. This is particularly visible for 
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the so-called contested goods, of which two are examined 
here. 
Our view contrasts sharply with neoclassical and broader 
economic notions of market exchanges which emphasize 
that only agreement on price between an individual buyer 
and seller is necessary for the exchange to take place. We 
have argued to the contrary, that exchange of a wide variety 
of artifacts relies on more than agreement on price, it relies 
on agreement about the underlying worth (and hence the 
meaning) of certain artifacts, and the legitimacy of exchang-
ing them on the market. 
We have used the examples of art galleries and surrogate 
mothers to illustrate how coordination about the justifica-
tion of value occurs and how different orders of worth rein-
force or destabilize one another. But our argument reaches 
further. The example of these goods for which market ex-
change is contested makes visible, as conflicts often do, what 
underlies market exchange more generally. We do not seek 
to argue that market exchange cannot be impersonal, instead 
we wish to highlight that market exchange relies on the im-
plicit agreement about the nature of the good and the ap-
propriate way to value it, even if individual valuations might 
differ within these constraints. In other words the under-
standing of the meaning of surrogate motherhood and art is 
shared by market participants, even though their willingness 
to pay might differ.
The value of a good is justified because it possesses certain 
qualities, which are related to certain notions of goodness or 
orders of worth. This non-price coordination relies on jus-
tifications that legitimize the worth of a good in relation to 
such a notion of goodness. Some reflection makes us real-
ize that we engage in these type of justifications all the time. 
When we call something expensive or cheap we do so in re-
lation to some order of worth. Such justifications are not iso-
lated from the context in which goods are exchanged. So the 
proper conduct of the seller and the buyer is different in an 
art-gallery then in the grocery-store. And such proper con-
duct is different when we compare surrogate motherhood 
agreements in the United States and Israel.
We believe there are several reasons why the question of 
emergent non-price coordination deserves attention. First, 
our research contributes to the work that looks into how 
markets come to exist and how they are retained. Although 
economists have a good general understanding about how 
markets work once they have emerged, the question where 
markets come from, and how they emerge or can be con-
structed is far less explored. Second, we provide a perspec-
tive valuable for historians of thought. Our thesis identifies 
links between the theory of justice that Adam Smith con-
sidered inseparable from his economic theory and today’s 
economic sociology that develops such a theory of justice 
more or less independently of our economic theory. Third, 
we believe to have identified understudied aspects of entre-
preneurship that have to do with the construction of justifi-
cations for the legitimacy of monetary exchange. 
In cases of contested artifacts, entrepreneurs often change 
our institutions, including our categories of thought. This 
type of entrepreneurship, in contrast with those types of 
entrepreneurship more closely related to price, has received 
little attention, precisely because economists have turned a 
blind eye to the agreement that underlies market exchange. 
We believe that further work looking into the understudied 
entrepreneurial functions of non-market coordination will 
give us a much needed understanding about the process of 
how the agreement on the appropriate order(s) of worth is 
negotiated in a world of elusive technological change and de-
velopment. Understanding the entrepreneurial activity that 
shapes our mental models and molds the existing orders of 
worth is indispensable for understanding the feasibility of 
certain institutional changes.8
nOtEs
1 Their work is part of a larger body of research, known 
in France as the economics of convention (Dupuy et al. 
1989; Thévenot et al. 2005).
2 Ronald Coase (1934) offers a major contribution toward 
our understanding of how the line between markets and 
hierarchies is drawn but we would like to look beyond 
the markets-hierarchies dichotomy. We agree that paral-
lel to markets there are hierarchical structures (firms or 
governments) as proposed by Coase and his neoinstitu-
tionalist followers but we further argue that besides hi-
erarchies there are also emergent nonhierarchical orders 
that interact with markets.
3 As Hayek (1982, p. 167) points out, “perhaps all that is 
innate is the fear of the frown and other signs of disap-
proval of our fellows.” 
4 The notion of “empathy” would perhaps in our common 
understanding of the term be closer to the meaning 
of the term “sympathy” employed among the Scottish 
Enlightenment scholars.
5 To go along with the garden metaphor, it should be 
made clear that unless the social norms are watered and 
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maintained, otherwise inappropriate behavior may soon 
grow again.
6 Explaining the concept of situational logic, Karl Popper 
(1976, p. 104) contends that “individuals act, in or for 
or through institutions. The general situational logic of 
these actions will be the theory of the quasi-actions of in-
stitutions.” Popper considered the problem of general 
situational logic and the theory of institutions to be the 
fundamental tasks of social science: “a theory of intend-
ed or unintended institutional consequences of purpo-
sive action … could also lead to a theory of the creation 
and development of institutions” (ibid.), “[t]he task of 
describing this social environment … is the fundamen-
tal task of social science,” this is a task of “explaining 
unintended and often undesired consequences of hu-
man action” (Popper 1976, pp. 101–102). On Popper’s 
concept of situational logic, see also Noretta Koertge 
(1979).
7 Carmel Shalev points out that being consistent with 
the halakhic (orthodox) doctrine of Jewish law, The 
Surrogate Mother Agreements Law (in force since 1996) 
“does not herald any revolution or even innovation in 
our attitude to reproduction, motherhood and wom-
en. On the contrary—it merely perpetuates values of a 
dominant patriarchal culture that does not treat women 
well. The Law glorifies motherhood and at the same 
time humiliates it” (Shalev 1998, p. 100).
8 This manuscript originally circulated under the title 
of “Economics of Convention: Sympathy and Social 
Norms” and was written for the 2015 Cosmos + Taxis 
conference at the Rochester Institute of Technology. 
For the invitation to present our work and for the sup-
port we are grateful to David Andersson and Lauren 
Hall. Furthermore we thank the participants at the 
2015 APEE conference in Cancún, the Vizier seminar 
at Erasmus University Rotterdam and at the 2015 SDAE 
conference in New Orleans. Finally, we acknowledge the 
insights of two referees. Any remaining errors are our 
responsibility.
rEfErEncEs
Abbing, H. (2002). Why Are Artists Poor? The Exceptional Economy of 
the Arts. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Becker, H. S. (1984). Art Worlds. Los Angeles: University of California 
Press.
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (1999). The Sociology of Critical 
Capacity. European Journal of Social Theory 2: 359–77.
Boltanski, L. and Thévenot, L. (2006). On Justification: Economies of 
Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brennan, J., and Jaworski, P. M. (2015). Markets Without Limits: Moral 
Virtues and Commercial Interests. New York: Routledge.
Caldwell, B. (2004). Hayek’s Challenge. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Coase, R. H. (1934). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4 (16): 
386–405.
Coslor, E. (2010). Hostile Worlds and Questionable Speculation: 
Recognizing the Plurality of Views about Art and the Market. 
In: Economic Action in Theory and Practice: Anthropological 
Investigations, 30: 209–24.
Denzau, A. T. and North, D. C. (1994). Shared Mental 
Models: Ideologies and Institutions. Kyklos 47 (1): 3–31. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1994.tb02246.x.
Dupuy, J.-P. et al. (1989). Introduction L’économie Des Conventions. 
Revue Économique 40 (2): 141–46.
Haakonssen, K. (1981). The Science of a Legislator: The Natural 
Jurisprudence of Hume and Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society.  
The American Economic Review 35 (4): 519–30. American Economic 
Association, 519–30.
Hayek, F. A. (1967). Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules on 
Conduct. In: Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 66–81. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, F. A. (1982). The Three Sources of Human Values. In: Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free 
People, 153–76. London: Routledge.
Hayek, F. A. (1988). The Collected Works of Friedrich August Hayek 
vol I, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. (W. W. Bartley III, 
Ed.). London: Routledge.
Keane, N. P. (1980). Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood. 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 2: 147–69.
Koertge, N. (1979). The Methodological Status of Popper’s Rationality 
Principle. Theory and Decision 10 (1–4): 83–95.
Kuchař, P. (2016). Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: The 
Case of Surrogate Motherhood. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 
26 (2): 349–379.
Lewis, P. and Lewin, P. (2015). Orders, Orders, Everywhere… on 
Hayek’s The Market and Other Orders. Cosmos + Taxis 2 (2): 1–17.
Popper, K. R. (1976). The Logic of Social Sciences. In: The Positivist 
Dispute in German Sociology, 87–104. London: Heinemann.
Radin, M. J. (1996). Contested Commodities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sandel, M. J. (2012). What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets. New York: Macmillan.
Satz, D. (2010). Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral 
Limits of Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
VOLUME 4   |  ISSUE 1  2017
CO
SM
O
S + TA
X
IS
34
Shalev, C. (1998). Halakha and Patriarchal Motherhood—An Anatomy 
of the New Israeli Surrogacy Law. Israel Law Review 32: 52–80. 
doi:10.1525/sp.2007.54.1.23.
Smith, A. (1776/1981). An Inquire into the Nature and Causes of The 
Wealth of Nations. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, A. (1759/1984). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund.
Stark, D. (2009). The Sense of Dissonance: Accounts of Worth in 
Economic Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Teman, E. (2003). The Medicalization of ‘Nature’ in the ‘Artificial 
Body’: Surrogate Motherhood in Israel. Medical Anthropology 
Quarterly 17: 78–98.
Thévenot, L. et al. (2005). Values, Coordination and Rationality: The 
Economy of Conventions. In: The Institutional Economics of Russia’s 
Transformation, ed. Anton N. Oleinik, 21–44. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Vaughn, K. I. (1999). Hayek’s Implicit Economics: Rules and the 
Problem of Order. The Review of Austrian Economics 11 (1): 129–44.
Velthuis, O. (2005). Talking Prices: Symbolic Meanings of Prices on the 
Market for Contemporary Art. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zelizer, V. A. (2000). The Purchase of Intimacy. Law and Social Inquiry 
25: 817–48. doi:10.1177/009430610703600616.
